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Boyd v. French
147 F.3d 319 (4th Cir. 1998)

I. Facts
The petitioner, Arthur Martin Boyd, Jr. ("Boyd"), and the victim, Wanda
Mae Phillips Hartman ("Hartman") lived together for three and one-half years.'
In April of 1982, Hartman moved out and returned to her parents' house.2 Boyd
protested this decision and, subsequent to her move, attempted to reconcile with
Hartman.3 Eight days prior to the murder, Boyd visited Hartman's parents'
house where Lawrence Phillips, Hartman's father, "instructed Boyd 'to get off
of [his] property and stay off of it."' 4 In response, Boyd allegedly threatened
Hartman, "I'll see you like a German submarine, when you are not expecting it."'
On Monday, August 2nd, an arrest warrant was sought and served on Boyd for
trespassing."
Following a night of drinking and drug use, Boyd called Hartman and spoke
to her for approximately two hours.7 During the course of this conversation,
Hartman revealed that she planned to go to the Mayberry Mall in Mount Airy,
North Carolina the following day.8 Following the phone call, Boyd resumed his
drinking and drug use at a bar.9 Around noon, the bartender refused to serve
Boyd any more alcohol and Boyd took a taxi to the Mayberry Mall." Once at the
mall, Boyd went to a store that sold knives and purchased a lock-blade knife."
Boyd spotted Hartman and her mother, approached them and requested
that Hartman step outside to speak with him.'2 According to the record, Boyd
and Hartman sat on a curb outside the mall, near the car wash, "apparently
discussing the possibility of a reconciliation."' 3 At approximately 2:00 p.m.,
1.
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Bqyd, 147 F.3d at 322.
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Id (citation omitted).
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
Boyd, 147 F.3d at 322.
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Bqyd, 147 F.3d at 322.
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Id The salesman who waited on Boyd testified at trial that "[a] lock-blade knife is a knife
that once it's opened it is locked in an open position. It cannot come back against your hands or
fingers or cut you in any way. It's locked in." Id
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Id at 322-23.
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Hartman's mother approached them and indicated that it was time to leave. 4
When Boyd begged her to stay with him for a few more minutes, Hartman told
him "that she had lived in hell for three months, that if he was going to kill her
just go ahead and kill her and get it over with.""5 At that point, Boyd brandished
his recently purchased knife at Hartman, assuring Hartman that he would not
hurt her. 6 However, Boyd soon commenced stabbing Hartman.
Despite
Hartman's efforts to defend herself as well as her mother's unsuccessful attempt
to intervene, Hartman died from the infliction of thirty-seven stab wounds in the
presence of numerous witnesses, including her eight-year-old daughter." Boyd
was apprehended quickly in the parking lot and the murder weapon was recovered from under a nearby vehicle."
Boyd was charged and convicted of first-degree murder in violation of
section 14-17 of the North Carolina General Statutes. 20 At trial, Boyd did not
contest that he had inflicted the fatal wounds. He did, however, present the
testimony of two friends with whom he had been drinking prior to the murder
as well as that2 of the bartender who refused to serve Boyd prior to his departure
for the mall. 1
At sentencing, Boyd spoke to his relationship with Hartman, their break-up,
his efforts at reconciliation, as well as his strong love for Hartman.' Further,
Boyd testified that he sought mental health assistance when Hartman terminated
their relationship, that he repeatedly attempted to reconcile with Hartman, that
he was experiencing difficulties in sleeping, and that he was abusing alcohol and
illegal drugs.' During sentencing, Boyd's emotional history of abandonment was
also explored. This consisted of testimony regarding the desertion of Boyd's
immediate family by his father when Boyd was very young and the death of
Boyd's grandfather, with whom he was very close, at age five.24 The defense then
called Dr.Jack Humphrey, a professor of criminology at the University of North
Carolina, to testify as to the relationship between this pattern of emotional loss
and Boyd's criminal behavior.2 The trial court sustained the State's objection to
14.
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18. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 323. When Hartman's mother tried to rescue her daughter, Boyd threw
the 76-year-old woman to the ground.
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20. Id See also
N.C. GEN. STAT. 5 14-17 (1993).
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22. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 323. Boyd testified that his love for Hartman was the "most beautiful
thing that's ever happened to me. It's the best thing that ever happened in my life. I loved her, more
than anybody, I guess, could ever love anybody." Id (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id
24. Id
25. Id at 323-24.
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the use of Dr. Humphrey's testimony as it was elicited on voir dire.26
In upholding Boyd's conviction and sentence on direct appeal, the North
Carolina Supreme Court held that the exclusion of Dr. Humphrey's testimony
was not error because it was not mitigating.27 Boyd unsuccessfully sought
postconviction relief in state court by filing a motion for appropriate relief
("MAR").2s Thereafter Boyd filed a federal habeas petition that was also
denied.29 He appealed the denial to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.

II. Holding
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, held that
(1) although the testimony of Dr. Humphrey may have been characterized as
30
mitigating, the sentencing court's failure to admit this testimony was harmless;
(2) the jury instructions did not violate the Constitution;31 (3) the prosecution's
closing argument, while improper, did not deprive Boyd of a fair trial; 32 (4) the
prosecution's knowing use of perjured testimony did not constitute a due process
violation; 33 and (5) the district court did not err in holding that federal habeas
review of the use of Boyd's nolo contendere plea to establish a prior violent
felony was barred because it was procedurally defaulted.'

III. Anaysis/App'cation in Virginia
A. Exclusion of Epert Testimony
The Fourth Circuit turned first to the sentencing court's refusal to admit Dr.
Humphrey's testimony linking Boyd's criminal acts to the circumstances of his
childhood as mitigating evidence. Dr. Humphrey's testimony, in addition to
having significance in mitigation, was also useful to rebut the State's case for
death. He interviewed Boyd and compared Boyd's history and characteristics to
those of the subjects of his research. He concluded that the class of people who
26.
Boyd, 147 F.3d at 324.
27.
Id See also State v. Boyd, 319 S.E.2d 189, 197-99 (N.C. 1984).
28.
Id This motion was made pursuant to section 15A-1415 of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Id
29.
Id at 325.
30.
Boyd, 147 F.3d at 325-28.
31.
Id at 328. The court dismissed this argument by referencing precedent holding identical
jury instructions not to be violative of the Constitution. Id Accordingly, the analysis of this claim
is not discussed further in this case'note.
32.
Id at 328-29.
33.
Id at 329-31.

34. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 321-22. This claim was procedurally defaulted under North Carolina
state law and is not discussed further in this analysis. Defense counsel should be aware that the
Virginia law regarding the nolo contendere plea is similar, if not more stringent.
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commit murder under similar circumstances are, among other things, less likely
to be violent in the future than the homicidal act itself might suggest.3"
The Fourth Circuit found the exclusion of Dr. Humphrey's testimony to be
error, but harmless error. 6 Defense counsel in Virginia, where future dangerousness is explicitly an aggravating factor, might well consider the use of such expert
testimony. If this tool is utilized, it is important to ensure that the expert interviews or tests the client. This may well be essential to admissibility of the expert's testimony.
The determination that exclusion of Dr. Humphrey's testimony was harmless error was made by employing the habeas review standard of Brecht v.
Abrahamson," a more forgiving standard to the state, the beneficiary of the error.
Brecht asks whether the error had "substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury's verdict."3 As a practical matter, this standard rewards
state courts for failure to correct constitutional error. On direct appeal, the
39
that is, the state
applicable standard is that announced in Chapman v. California;
(again, the beneficiary of the error) must show the error to have been harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.' At least in those situations where the Supreme
Court of Virginia has not expressly ruled on an issue, defense counsel should
consider urging the reasoning found in Orndoffv. Lockhardt," an Eighth Circuit
decision, that applies Chapman.42
B. Commonwealth's Closing Argument
The court of appeals also evaluated the prosecution's closing argument in
light of due process requirements. Boyd challenged the argument on the basis
that the prosecution made references to his personal opinions, biblical quotations, the appropriateness of the death penalty for Boyd, and to a later-repudiated
system of mandatory capital punishment.43 The court of appeals determined that
the State's argument was "improper" and went on to question whether it rendered the sentencing trial "fundamentally unfair."" The court found that the
35.

Id. at 326.
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Id at 326-28.
507 U.S. 619 (1993).

38.
Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 631 (1993) (citing Kotteakos v. United States, 328
U.S. 750, 776 (1946)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

39.

386 U.S. 18 (1967).

40.
41.

Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22-24 (1967).

998 F.2d 1426 (8th Cir. 1993).
Omdorffv. Lockhardt, 998 F.2d 1426,1429 (8th Cir. 1993) (reasoning that because the
"state courts did not have the opportunity to review the error at all... th[e] rule announced in Brecht
does not apply and that the Chapman harmless error standard is the appropriate test in this case").
43.
Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319, 328-29 (4th Cir. 1998)
44. Boyd, 147 F.3d at 329 (citing Bennett v. Angelone, 92 F.3d 1336, 1345-46 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 117 S. Ct. 503 (1996)).

42.
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following required a finding that the prosecution's closing argument did not
deprive Boyd of a fair trial: (1) the fact that the evidence pointed overwhelmingly
to Boyd's guilt; (2) the heinous nature of the crime; (3) Boyd's stipulated prior
history of violence; (4) the fact that some of the biblical references were made in
response to Boyd's explanation for his motivation for the commission of the
murder; and (5) that the trial judge instructed the jurors that the comments made
by attorneys were not evidence on which they were permitted to base their
verdict.45
The court's familiar treatment of impermissible argument, that is, to condemn the prosecution's behavior and then forgive it based on harmless error,
highlights the limited means available to defense counsel to combat the practice.
Even in order to preserve the merits of the issue from default, however, objection must be made on due process grounds at the moment the offending words
are spoken.46
Improper arguments are also unethical. When the United States Supreme
Court shielded prosecutors from civil liability, it did so in part in reliance on the
profession's ability to police itself.47 In aggravated instances of prosecutorial
misconduct, defense counsel should consider filing complaints with the Virginia
Bar pursuant to Disciplinary Rule 7-10548 or Rule 3.4(f of the Proposed Rules,49
in the event these rules are adopted.
C. Intoxication and the Issue of Premeditation
Boyd also claimed that his conviction resulted from the prosecution's illegal
use of perjured testimony and was therefore violative of due process requirements. Either the prosecution's solicited use or passive acceptance of perjured
testimony violates due process.5" The responsibility for the knowingly false or
misleading testimony by a law enforcement officer is imputed to the prosecutor.
This relationship was explained by the Fourth Circuit in Barbee v. Warden"' as
follows:
45.
Id
46.
See Russo v. Commonwealth, 148 S.E.2d 820, 825 (Va. 1966) ("Objection to improper
argument of counsel should be made at the time and the court should be requested to instruct the
jury to disregard it.... Failure to make timely objection ordinarily constitutes a waiver.") (citations
omitted).
47.
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,429 (1976) ("[A] prosecutor stands perhaps unique,
among officials whose acts could deprive persons of constitutional rights, in his amenability to
professional discipline by an association of his peers. These checks undermine the argument that
the imposition of civil liability is the only way to insure that prosecutors are mindful of the
constitutional rights of persons accused of crime.").
48.
VA. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Disciplinary Rule 7-105 (1997).
49.
ProposedVA. RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Rule 3.4.
50.
Boyd v. French, 147 F.3d 319,329 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S.
150, 153 (1972); & Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959)).
51.
331 F.2d 842 (4th Cir. 1964)
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The police are also part of the prosecution, and the taint on the trial is no less
if they, rather than the State's Attorney, were guilty of the non-disclosure. If
the police allow the State's Attorney to produce evidence pointing to guilt
without informing him of other evidence in their possession which contradicts this inference, state officers are practicing deception not only on the
State's Attorney but on the court and the defendant. 2

that the
A due process violation exists when "there is any reasonable likelihood
53
jury."
the
of
judgement
the
affected
have
could
testimony
false
In Boyd's case, the State's witness testified at trial that Boyd was not, or did
not appear to be, intoxicated. 4 However, during Boyd's subsequent MAR
hearings, the same witnesses testified that they believed Boyd to be under the
influence of alcohol around the time of the murder.55 The court of appeals
declined to hold that testimony by the officers that Boyd56appeared to be under
the influence would have affected the verdict of the jury.
With respect to the use of evidence indicating intoxication, under Virginia
law, intoxication may, in the rare circumstance, negate premeditation. This
defense is available only in first degree and capital murder cases5 7 and the threshold showing for this argument is very high.
Alix Marie Karl

52.

Barbee v. Warden, 331 F.2d 842, 846 (4th Cir. 1964) (footnote omitted).

53.
Boyd, 147 F.3d at 330 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
54.
Id
55.
Id at 330-31.
56.
Id at 331. The following rationale was offered for this holding:
The jury heard a wealth of testimony concerning the amount of alcohol and drugs that
Boyd had ingested in the hours prior to the murder; undoubtedly the jury recognized
that Boyd must have been impaired to some degree. However, the testimony of the
lay witnesses and police officers established that despite the alcohol and drugs, Boyd's
demeanor prior to and immediately after the murder was calm and controlled. As
such, testimony by the officers that Boyd was under the influence would not have
affected the verdict of the jury.

Id
57.

See Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522 (Va. 1998).

